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Abstract 
We prove the existence of a representative agent in an economy populated with
investors who keep up with the Joneses and have heterogeneous portfolio
endowments. This result is independent of the endowment distribution and robust to a
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Gal´ ı (1994) studies the portfolio choice and asset pricing implications of
“keeping up with the Joneses” preferences whereby a representative agent
evaluates her consumption relative to her peers’ contemporaneous average
or “per capita” consumption. Recent papers - see Shore and White (2002),
Lauterbach and Reisman (2004) and G´ omez, Priestley and Zapatero (2004)-
use this type of preferences as a possible explanation of the home bias puzzle:
why investors overinvest in domestic assets inspite of the documented gains
of international risk-diversiﬁcation.
An important and more basic question to ask is whether Joneses pref-
erences per se can generate biased portfolios in equilibrium. Gal´ ı (1994)
showed that, in a symmetric equilibrium, they cannot. In this paper we
extend this “negative result” by showing that Joneses preferences cannot
solve, on their own, the home bias puzzle even if agents have heterogenous
portfolio endowments.
In Section 1, we prove the existence of a representative agent in an econ-
omy populated with investors who keep up with the Joneses and have het-
erogenous portfolio endowments. This result is independent of the portfolio
endowment distribution.
In Section 2, we check the robustness of our result to the Joneses def-
inition. Arguably, agents with too low or too high consumption (below or
above a given consumption threshold) might be considered as outliers and
“fall out” of the Joneses average consumption. Moreover, the Joneses do
not necessarily have to be unique. Consumers living in diﬀerent “clusters”
or communities (deﬁned in terms of geographical proximity, language, age
or any other aﬃnity attribute) might have “diﬀerent Joneses.” We show
that the representative agent result is robust to these reﬁnements.
The paper concludes with Section 3.
1 The existence of a representative agent








with α > 0 the risk aversion coeﬃcient and 0 < γ < 1 the “Joneses para-
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by shares of K −1 “ﬁrms” (Lucas’ trees). At time t = 1, ﬁrm k has random
payoﬀs Yk = (yk(1),...,yk(s),...,yk(S))0. Payoﬀs are expressed in units of
the consumption good. We assume the number of states S = K. Let
asset K be a riskless bond with price 1/(1+r). Call Y = (Y1,...,Yk,...,YK)
the payoﬀ matrix. We assume that ﬁnancial markets are complete, i.e.,
Y is non-singular. Let pk denote the price of a share of ﬁrm k. Hence,
p = (p1,...,pk,...,pK) is the price vector, with pK = 1/(1 + r). We denote
πs the probability of state s.







j )0. Let θ =
P
j θj be the aggregate endowment. We
assume θ
k > 0 for all k < K. The bond is in zero net supply (θ
K = 0).
At time t = 0 the, investor j chooses the portfolio that maximizes her
expected utility of future consumption cj(θj) = Y θj given prices p:
θ∗
j(p, ¯ θj) = argmaxθ Eu(cj(θ),X)
s.t. p(θ − θj) ≤ 0







for each agent j and asset k; λ∗





j (p, ¯ θj), the optimal state s contingent consump-
tion at prices p.
In this setting we deﬁne the equilibrium as a collection of portfolio
choices and prices {(θ∗
1,...,θ∗
J);p∗} such that (i) θ∗
j = θ∗
j(p∗, ¯ θj) for all j and
(ii) ﬁnancial markets clear:
P
j θ∗
j = ¯ θ.
In equilibrium, for each Arrow-Debreu pure security with price ψs and
payoﬀs ys(s) = 1, ys(s0) = 0 for all s0 6= s, equation (1) becomes:
λ∗




j(s|p∗) the state s contingent consumption in equilibrium.
For asset K (the bond), λ∗
j = (1 + r)
P
s πsu0(c∗
j(s)) = (1 + r)Eπ(u0(c∗
j)).
Hence, under the assumption of positive marginal utility of consumption,
λ∗
j > 0 for all j. Equation (2) can be rewritten as:
1To simplify the notation, we drop hereafter the X from the utility functions.
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Proposition 1 Given the equilibrium {(θ∗
1,...,θ∗
J);p∗}, if we replace the J
agents with utility function u(cj,X), with X = (1/J)
P
j cj, by a represen-
tative agent with utility function
U(C) =
C(1−α(1−γ))
1 − α(1 − γ)
(4)
endowed with the economy’s aggregate endowment, the equilibrium prices p∗
will not change.
More concretely, for any endowment distribution ( ¯ θ1,..., ¯ θJ) and prices p
the aggregate portfolio demand
P
j θ∗
j(p, ¯ θj) = θ∗(p, ¯ θ), with θ∗(p, ¯ θ) the rep-
resentative agent’s portfolio and ¯ θ =
P
j ¯ θj the aggregate endowment supply.
In equilibrium, θ∗(p∗, ¯ θ) = ¯ θ with p∗
k =
P
s ψsyk(s). State prices are a
function of the aggregate endowment, ψs = πs
1+r
U0( ¯ C(s))
Eπ(U0( ¯ C)), with ¯ C = Y ¯ θ.
Proof: Let’s deﬁne a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function as a func-
tion W : <J → < that assigns a utility value to each possible vector
(u1,...,uJ) ∈ <J of utility levels for the J consumers in the economy. We
assume that the social welfare function is monotonous non-decreasing and
diﬀerentiable.
For each level of prices p and aggregate endowment ¯ θ, let (¯ θ1(p, ¯ θ),..., ¯ θJ(p, ¯ θ))
be the endowments distribution with
P
j ¯ θj(p, ¯ θ) = ¯ θ such that the portfolios
(θ∗
1(p, ¯ θ1),...,θ∗
J(p, ¯ θJ)) solve






θj − ¯ θ

 ≤ 0.
Then we know2 that the value function V (p,(¯ θ1,..., ¯ θJ)) is an indirect
utility function of a representative consumer with portfolio θ∗(p,(¯ θ1,..., ¯ θJ)) = P
j θ∗
j(p, ¯ θj(p, ¯ θ)), the aggregate portfolio demand. Notice that, in general,
the representative agent’s portfolio depends on the endowments distribution.
Since the payoﬀ matrix Y is non-singular, there is a one-to-one mapping
between state-contingent consumption and portfolios. Thus, we can workout
2Proposition 4.D.1 in Mas-Colell, Whiston and Green (1995), page 117
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IE Working Papers'), 10-02-05directly the representative agent’s utility function as a function of aggregate
consumption. For any state s = 1,2,...,S, and aggregate consumption C(s)
let us rewrite the social welfare function problem as




cj(s) − C(s) ≤ 0,
cj(s) ≥ 0 for all j.
The Lagrangian function for the later problem will be:









































s = 0. (8)
Assume the consumption is strictly positive for all agents in all states.
By condition (6), this implies that the optimality condition (5) is binding
and λ∗
s = ∂
∂cj(s)W(·) > 0 for all s. Applying the chain rule to the right-hand
side:
λ∗
s = Wj u0(c∗
j(s)), (9)
with λ∗
s the multiplier of the aggregate wealth constrain and Wj =
∂
∂u(cj(θj))W(·), constant across states.
3The function W(·) is monotonous non-decreasing. This plus the concavity of the
utility function guarantees that the objective function is quasi-concave.
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where we have used the binding4 aggregate consumption constraint (7).







Replacing (11) for λ∗
s in (12) and integrating over C(s) we obtain the














Take now the deﬁnition of X(s) = (1/J)
P
j cj(s). By the binding con-














The aggregate agent’s utility function (4) is just a monotonous non-
decreasing, aﬃne transformation of the later function, hence representing
the same preferences. Call θ(p,(¯ θ1,..., ¯ θJ)) =
P
j θj(p, ¯ θj) the demand func-
tion of the representative agent. The utility function (4) is independent of
the endowment distribution; it only depends on the aggregate endowment.
Hence, θ(p,(¯ θ1,..., ¯ θJ)) = θ(p,
P
j ¯ θj) = θ(p, ¯ θ). In equilibrium, by mar-
ket clearing, θ∗ = θ(p∗, ¯ θ) = ¯ θ. Applying equilibrium condition (3) to the




s > 0 and given the optimality condition (8).
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In this section we study whether our representative agent derivation is ro-
bust to the inclusion of some measure of dispersion in the Joneses deﬁnition.
Notice that this question cannot be addressed in a symmetric equilibrium
where every agent has the same endowment. However, in our setting, port-
folio endowments (hence consumption) diﬀer across agents. To see this, just
solve for u0(c∗























j is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint in the agent’s
optimal portfolio problem. Hence, as long as the market value (at the equi-
librium prices p∗) of the portfolio endowments is diﬀerent across agents, λ∗
j
(and consumption) will be also diﬀerent.
Let ¯ J ⊆ J be a subset (as well as the cardinal) of agents that satisfy
certain condition (in terms of portfolio endowment, and hence, consumption)
to belong to the Joneses. For instance, ¯ J = {j ∈ J such that ¯ θl < ¯ θj < ¯ θu},
for a given lower (¯ θl) and upper (¯ θu) bound on portfolio endowments. The
following proposition shows that as long as the Joneses are deﬁned as an
average consumption, in equilibrium, the resulting representative investor
has a “Joneses-free” utility function.
Proposition 2 Let ¯ X(s) = (1/ ¯ J)
P
j∈ ¯ J c∗
j(s), ¯ J ⊆ J, represent the Joneses
average consumption under a given dispersion measure. Assume ¯ J 6= ∅.
Then, the representative agent’s utility function in equilibrium is an aﬃne
transformation of the “Joneses-free” utility function (4) in Proposition 1.











































































Therefore, the newly deﬁned Joneses are also proportional, in any state,
to the aggregate consumption C(s). Notice that, in the later equation, if
¯ J ≡ J, then ¯ X(s) ≡ X(s). Replacing ¯ X(s) into equation (13) the proof is
complete. Q.E.D.
After this proposition, it is very simple to show that the representative
agent’s utility function in Proposition 2 is robust to the existence of several
Joneses. Assume now that agents belong to q = {1,...,Q} disjoint com-
munities (Q ≥ 2). Each community has Jq members, so that
S
q Jq = J
is the total set of consumers. The preferences of agent j that belongs to








with Xq = (1/Jq)
P
j∈Jq cj. Let θ
q
j(p, ¯ θj) denote the optimal portfolio for
agent j in community q.




Jq(p∗, ¯ θJq)]q=1,..,Q;p∗} be the equilibrium.
If we replace all members in community q with utilities u(cj,Xq), with Xq =
(1/Jq)
P
j∈Jq qj, by a representative agent with utility function
U(C) =
C(1−α(1−γ))
1 − α(1 − γ)




equilibrium prices p∗ will not change. Additionally, the same equilibrium
prices will prevail if all community representative agents are replaced by
a single representative agent, with the same CRRA, “Joneses-free” utility
function endowed with the overall aggregate endowment ¯ θ =
P
q ¯ θq.
The proof of this corollary follows trivially after applying Proposition 2
ﬁrst to all members within each community and then to the representative
agents across communities.
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In this paper, we prove the existence of a representative agent in an economy
populated with investors who keep up with the Joneses and have heteroge-
nous portfolio endowments. The representative investor has a “Joneses-free”
utility function with lower risk aversion coeﬃcient. This result is indepen-
dent of the portfolio endowment distribution and robust to the inclusion of
a dispersion measure in the Joneses deﬁnition.
These results have implications for portfolio holdings and asset pricing.
Concretely: (i) no aggregate portfolio bias can be explained exclusively on
the basis of Joneses behaviour; and (ii) absent any additional friction, the
equilibrium asset pricing model in the presence of Joneses behaviour is equiv-
alent to the single factor International CAPM with a (proper) lower global
market risk-premium.
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